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16.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I  discuss the role  world  macroeconomic factors- 
interest rates, commodity  prices, and industrial countries’ growth- 
have played  in bringing the debt crisis about and how they either fa- 
cilitated or made more difficult the first five years of adjustment. I also 
ask whether and how the world macroeconomy is likely to contribute 
to the solution of the debt problem in the years ahead. 
16.2  External Debt and Debt Crisis 
I first set out a conceptual framework to discuss debt problems and 
the macroeconomic background to the debt crisis in  1979-82. 
16.2.1  A Conceptual Framework 
Debt service difficulties may either take the form of  an inability to 
pay the principal  of a maturing debt, as is the case for Colombia or 
Venezuela today, or an inability to pay both interest and principal. I 
focus here on debt difficulties of the more serious kind, where interest 
cannot be paid. The reason is that difficulties in paying principal, when 
interest is regularly paid, should not present any problem since rolling 
over is a routine operation. The only reason difficulties with principal 
can become debt problems is if  creditors wish to limit their regional 
exposure and hence insist  on payment of principal  even from those 
countries who are good debtors. 
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Focusing on interest payments, the current account of the balance 
of payments can be separated into two components: the noninterest 
current account (NICA) which includes trade in goods and in all ser- 
vices except interest payments on the external debt on the one hand, 
and interest payments on the other. Interest payments in turn can be 
financed by noninterest surpluses or by net capital inflows: 
(1)  Interest Payments = NICA + Net Capital Inflows 
“Net Capital Inflows” includes four categories: reserve decumulation, 
direct foreign investment inflows, long-term portfolio inflows, and short- 
or medium-term borrowing abroad which is often called “new money.” 
In the debt problems of the interwar period or the period  preceding 
1914, new money took the form of a “funding loan.”  Today it is con- 
certed or involuntary  lending by the commercial bank creditors and 
multilateral institutions. 
Table  16.1  shows these current account components for problem 
debtor countries in the 1978-87 period.’ In the period up to 1982 both 
interest payments and the noninterest deficit need financing and hence 
are reflected in a rapidly rising debt. Since 1983 a large part of interest 
is paid by noninterest surpluses and hence the increase in debt is lim- 
ited.  But even so, debt is  still rising,  reflecting the financing of the 
remaining interest payments not met by the surplus, and the financing 
of capital flight and reserve build-up. 
A noninterest deficit is often called the net inward resource transfer 
since it measures the net imports of goods and services (other than 
interest) over which a country acquires command. Noninterest deficits 
Table 16.1  The Current Account Deficit and External Debt: Countries with 
Recent Debt-Servicing Difficulties ($ billion) 
Noninterest Current  Current 
(Resource Transfer)  Payments  Deficit  Debt 
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are the normal pattern for developing countries in which saving is low 
relative to investment. They are the channel through which resources 
are transferred from rich to poor countries to support capital formation 
and growth in the developing world. Private and public lending form 
the financial counterpart. Using the national accounts identities we can 
represent in (2) the financing of investment from the resource point of 
view. 
(2)  Investment = Saving + Real Resource Transfer from Abroad 
The abrupt reduction in financing of noninterest deficits, or the re- 
duction in net inward real resource transfers has meant a sharp decline 
in investment for Latin America. Since 1982, by comparison with the 
period  1973-82,  investment has declined by 5 percent of GDP which 
is exactly equal to the swing in resource transfers. Now debtors are 
transferring resources to creditors. 
16.2.2  Debt Crises 
Any debt crisis involves the inability of debtors to make timely pay- 
ments of interest and principal. Five factors can be identified as  leading 
to a gap between interest payments that are due and the noninterest 
current account: 
I. With an unchanged willingness to roll over debt and provide a given 
flow of money, an increase in real interest rates raises the financing 
requirement. The imbalance between new money requirements and 
credit voluntarily supplied brings about a debt crisis. 
2. A deterioration in the noninterest current account-because  of do- 
mestic macroeconomics, a worsening in the terms of trade, or a fall 
in export demand-opens a financing gap. 
3. An increase in world inflation leads to an increase in nominal interest 
rates and hence to an early real amortization of the external debt. 
Although real interest rates are unchanged, a cash flow problem for 
debtors results from increased nominal interest rates. 
4. With an unchanged interest rate and noninterest current account, 
creditors decide that exposure is excessive and therefore limit new 
money commitments and require that maturing principal be paid off. 
5. Industrial  activity  in  developed  countries affects  the demand for 
exports from developing countries. A slowdown or recession re- 
duces quantity  demanded and lowers prices, thus impairing  debt 
service ability. 
I now proceed to identify the impact of world macroeconomic events 
on debtor countries. Specifically, in what way has the world macroe- 
conomy been  one of  the factors leading to the debt crisis, how  has 
it  influenced  the evolution  of  debt problems  since  1982, and  what 302  Rudiger Dornbusch 
implications can be anticipated from alternative scenarios of the world 
economy in the coming years? World interest rates, growth, and com- 
modity price trends are at the center of  the discussion. 
16.3  The World Macroeconomy: An Overview 
Figures 16.1 and 16.2 highlight two important external variables for 
debtor countries: the real interest rate and the real price of commod- 
ities. In figure 16.1 I show the London interbank offer rate for dollar 
deposits (LIBOR) adjusted by the rate of inflation in world trade.2 The 
central role of interest rates in precipitating the debt crisis is shown 
by the peak level of an interest rate in excess of 18 percent in late 1981. 
The interest rate effects appear through two separate channels. One 
is associated with  the level of  nominal rates, given the real  rate of 
interest. When higher inflation increases the nominal interest rate, the 
effect on debtors is a shortening of the effective maturity of the debt. 
The real value of  the debt is amortized at a faster pace. As a result, 
debtors may experience liquidity problems. In  1980-82  debtor coun- 
tries were hurt both by increased nominal interest rates and by declining 
commodity prices. The combination implies that the real interest rate 
facing debtor countries was much higher than 20 percent per year. Of 
course, real interest rates had already reached high levels on previous 
occasions, as for example, in the period 1975-76.  But at that time debt 
ratios were much lower and, accordingly, the vulnerability to interest 
rate shocks was less. 
Figure  16.2 represents  the  real  price  of  commodities. The  series 
shown here is the IMF index of all (nonoil) commodities deflated by 
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Fig. 16.2  The real price of commodities 
the export unit value of  industrial countries. Commodity prices have 
steadily declined since their peak levels in  1973-74.  By late 1986 they 
had fallen to only 40 percent of the peak level. But in the early 1980s, 
when the debt crisis first broke out, the real price of commodities did 
not show a dramatic deterioration. Commodity prices thus were not 
an immediate source of the crisis, but they did become relevant later 
in  raising the costs of adjustment for several debtor countries. In fact, 
to the extent that real commodity prices were high in the late 1970s, 
they contributed to the borrowing spree. Later, when they declined, 
they aggravated the debt crisis over and above what it otherwise would 
have been. 
Table 16.2 shows data for these aggregate indices. The averages for 
the 1960s and 1970s are reported, as well as more detailed information 
on the period of  the debt crisis. In addition to interest rates, real com- 
modity prices, and economic activity in industrial countries, a further 
external factor influences the noninterest current account: commercial 
policy in developed countries and its influence on market access and 
hence, developing country  export performance.  There are no good 
aggregate indicators of market access or of changes in market access. 
But there is also no evidence that this factor was an important element 
in provoking the debt crisis. Of  course, that does not mean that pro- 
tectionism did not increase the costs and difficulties of debtor countries 
once the crisis had started. 
16.4  The Period 1982-87 
When the debt crisis emerged in  1982 there was a ready consensus 
that  a  package  of  adjustment  and  financing could  see  debtors  and 304  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Table 16.2  Aggregate World Macroeconomic Indicators 
Real Commodity  LIBOR  Inflationb 
Prices (1980 =  100)"  (%)  (%) 
1960-69  115  5.2  1 .o 
1970-79  115  8.0  11.4 
1980  100  14.4  13.0 
1981  96  16.5  -4.1 
I982  89  13.1  -  3.5 
1983  98  9.6  -  3.3 
1984  101  10.8  -  2.5 
1985  88  8.3  -0.4 
1986  72  6.9  13.7 
I987  63  6.8  12.8 
World ActivityC 











Source: IMF and Economic Commission for Latin America. 
aMeasured in terms of manufactures export prices of industrial countries. 
bRate of inflation of industrial countries' unit export values. 
%dustrial  production. 
creditors through the worst difficulties until the world economy turned, 
as was expected, in a more favorable direction. What precisely were 
the expectations about the external environment facing debtor countries? 
16.4.1  The Beliefs of 1982 
When Mexico in 1982-and  shortly afterwards a host of Latin Amer- 
ican countries-encountered acute debt service problems, the process 
of  concerted or involuntary lending started. The prevailing philosophy 
of that process had three ingredients: 
To  assure an ultimate return to voluntary  lending it was essential 
that debtor countries should service their debts, to the maximum 
extent  possible,  on  commercial  terms  and  without  significant 
concessions other than  with  respect to the maturity  of  the debt 
principal. 
Adjustments in debtor countries, specifically in the budget and ex- 
change rates, would go far in bringing about a swing in the nonin- 
terest balance so as to service debt. 
An  improving  world  economy-recovery,  rising  real  commodity 
prices, and declining real interest rates-would  make a substantial 
contribution in  reducing  the burden  of  debt servicing.  From the 
vantage point of 1982, the macroeconomy could only improve. Debtor 
countries could anticipate higher growth in demand for their exports, 
lower interest rates, and improving terms of trade. 
The question of adjustment in debtor countries is beyond the scope 
of this chapter and has been amply dealt with elsewhere.3 The issue 
of interest here is the contribution of the world macroeconomy.  Cer- 305  Debt Problems and the World Macroeconomy 
tainly in  1982 the outlook must have been favorable. Specifically, the 
scenarios in  the IMF World Economic  Outlook of that year reflected 
the following views: 
The world economy was in the deepest recession since the 1930s. 
In the recovery period there had to be, accordingly, an expectation 
of growth significantly above trend. This growth would bring about 
two results. First, it would mean an increase in demand for man- 
ufactures exports from debtor countries. Second, it would translate 
into a cyclical upturn  of  real  commodity  prices.  These stylized 
facts were quite beyond doubt, given the ample empirical evidence 
on  the  cyclical  behavior  of  real  commodity  prices  and  export 
 volume^.^ 
With respect to interest rates, the outlook also had to be outright 
favorable. The short-term interest rate was at record  high levels 
in American history. These high  levels of  interest rates were an 
immediate result of a deliberate attempt to use monetary policy to 
stop the sharply accelerating U.S. inflation of  the late  1970s and 
early  1980s. With the success of  disinflation, interest rates would 
decline and hence the extraordinary debt service burdens of  1982 
would come down. 
The expectation of declining nominal interest rates  and cyclically 
rising nominal and real export prices for debtor countries implied an 
expectation of low real interest rates. Recovery and sustained growth 
in  the industrial countries were expected to translate into significant 
growth in  export volumes. At the time there was apparently no rec- 
ognition of the real interest rate consequences of rapid disinflation and 
of the U.S. monetary-fiscal mix. The early scenarios are also revealing 
in  that there was a quite explicit confidence that current account im- 
balances could be financed. 
16.4.2  The Actual Experience Since 1982 
respects: 
The actual outcome differed from the IMF scenario in the following 
Real interest rates continued to be far higher than expected. The 
U.S. monetary-fiscal mix  had  strong implications for the perfor- 
mance of countries with high debt ratios and a high ratio of floating 
rate debt. 
The real oil price fell dramatically and hence the relative perfor- 
mance  of  net  oil exporters  was  due to their  adjustment  efforts 
rather than to favorable terms of trade. 
The assumption that debtor countries could afford to run significant 
current  account  deficits  was  overly  optimistic.  Financing  con- 
straints in fact limited these deficits. 306  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Nominal interest rates did, indeed, decline significantly from their 
peak levels, and OECD growth was somewhat above the 3 percent 
threshold that had been set as a benchmark for solving debt problems. 
The significant difference from the 1982 outlook involved commodity 
prices. Rather than showing a recovery in nominal and real terms, they 
in fact continued to decline. The decline was so significant that in 1986 
they were at a lower level than at any time in the preceding quarter of 
a century (see figure  16.2 above). In nominal terms they  had fallen 
back to the level of  1977. 
The belief that debt and debt service ratios would decline has not in 
fact  been  borne  out. On  every  measure  of  creditworthiness  debtor 
countries today look worse than they did in  1982, except for the debt 
service ratio. The reduction in interest rates since 1982 clearly helped 
reduce the service ratio, as did the long-term restructuring of debts. 
But even though there is a marginal reduction in the debt service ratio, 
the extent of  decline falls short of  the 1982 expectations. 
16.5  The Outlook 
In this section I ask whether important changes in the world mac- 
roeconomic outlook lie ahead that might help overcome the debt prob- 
lem or whether, on the contrary, world macroeconomic developments 
threaten  to  make  the  solution  much  more  difficult. On  the  side of 
macroeconomics there is certainly a possibility of  two quite different 
scenarios, depending on the way in which the U.S. budget problem is 
solved and the response of  interest rates and the dollar to budget cuts 
when they occur. 
The medium-term outlook is neither outright unfavorable nor excep- 
tionally favorable. Table 16.3 lays out the IMF’s 1988 viewss There is 
an expectation of continued, moderate growth in the world economy. 
No major changes in relative prices are anticipated, and real interest 
rates are not expected to decline. This outlook represents a baseline. 
Sharply different  scenarios are possible depending on the fiscal ad- 
justments that lie ahead in the U.S. economy. 
16.5.1  U.S. Adjustment: Implications for Debtor Countries 
It is interesting to go beyond the baseline forecast and explore what 
consequences U.S. adjustment of the twin deficits can have for debtor 
countries. 
Two features of U.S.  adjustment can be highlighted as in table 16.4. 
One is whether there is a hard or soft landing. The hard landing scenario 
envisages a collapse of the dollar caused by a loss of confidence. This 
collapse in turn translates into a sharp upturn of  U.S. inflation, and 
induces the Federal Reserve to severely tighten monetary conditions. 307  Debt Problems and the World Macroeconomy 
Table 16.3  The IMF 1988 Outlook (percent per year) 




Real six-month LIBORa 
2.8  2.6  2.8 
4.7  4.3  3.0 
3.0  3.1  4.3 
Prices in world trade 
Manufactures  8.0  3.4  3.5 
Nonoil primary commodities  9.4  1 .o  3.5 
Oil  -  7.8  5.1  3.5 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April). 
"Deflated by U.S. GNP deflator. 
Table 16.4  Consequences for Debtors of U.S. Adjustment Scenarios 
Soft Landing  Hard Landing 
Trade restrictions 
No trade restrictions 
The result is a recession and high real interest rates. The soft landing, 
by  contrast, assumes that fiscal policy turns increasingly restrictive, 
and monetary policy accomodates with a decline in interest rates. The 
dollar falls and thus growth of output is sustained by an improvement 
in  net exports. Growth thus is  stable and inflation rises moderately. 
Real interest rates clearly decline. 
The second  dimension concerns  trade policy. Here there  are two 
possibilities: targeted restrictions on countries with large bilateral sur- 
pluses (Japan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico) or no significant change in trade 
policy. 
Sustained U.S. growth with low real interest rates and unimpaired 
market access means debt problems will become significantly smaller. 
Of  course, the counterpart of  U.S. external balance improvement in 
this case is a worsening of the net exports of  Europe and Japan. But 
lower real interest rates have a self-correcting property in that debtor 
countries can reduce their noninterest surplus and still improve their 
creditworthiness.  This feature means that there is not  necessarily a 
conflict between  U.S. and  debtor country  objectives.  When  debtor 
countries argue for the need to reduce U.S. deficits, they presumably 
have this scenario in mind. 308  Rudiger Dornbusch 
The other extreme scenario is a hard landing with trade restrictions. 
The consequences are obvious: Recession and high real interest rates 
move debt service  problems far beyond what debtor countries can make 
up for by domestic adjustments. Trade restrictions further worsen their 
ability  to service debts. The almost certain consequence would  be 
runover 1930-style debt defaults or indefinite suspension of debt service. 
World growth and real interest rates are central in judging the impact 
of alternative scenarios for debtor countries. On the side of growth, 
U.S.  fiscal adjustment will tend to reduce growth in the world economy. 
If  U.S. output growth  is sustained, even as the growth  of domestic 
spending is reduced as a result of fiscal correction, this will mean that 
real depreciation is necessary to raise net exports and that, accordingly, 
foreign growth will tend to be less. It is very unlikely that Europe and 
Japan will  provide an expansion in demand sufficient to keep world 
output growth constant. Thus, on the growth side, the performance of 
the past few years is not likely to be sustained. But on the interest rate 
side, there may be a favorable development. If the U.S. reduces the 
budget deficit and keeps growth up through lower interest rates, the 
dollar will depreciate. This is likely to force Europe and Japan into 
interest rate reductions even if that would threaten monetary discipline. 
The impact of interest rates on debtors’ current account balances is, 
of  course, very significant. For Latin America a 2.5 percentage point 
reduction in interest rates would amount to a foreign exchange saving 
of nearly 8 percent of total imports. Hence the importance to debtors 
of the easier monetary conditions that would accompany a reduction 
of the U.S. budget deficit. 
Trade barriers might not be applied uniformly across U.S. trading 
partners. They might instead be applied only to industrial countries, 
specifically Japan, or only to current account surplus countries, rather 
than to countries with bilateral surpluses. For debtors the implication 
here is that an improvement in debt service ability of  countries like 
Mexico or Brazil might be paid for by extra restrictions  on Korea or 
Taiwan. Thus developing countries as a group might  experience an 
improvement, while specific countries like Korea bear the burden. 
There is another way of looking at U.S. adjustment and the impli- 
cations for debtor countries. Suppose that the U.S. in fact achieved a 
$100 billion reduction in the external deficit. Assume also that this had 
as a counterpart a $20 billion improvement in the U.S. bilateral trade 
balance with Latin America. How can Latin America experience a $20 
billion reduction in the resource transfers to developed countries? There 
are only two ways: through  much lower interest rates or significant 
extra financing. Thus any hard landing scenario without default nec- 
essarily involves a dramatic change in financing availability which is 
not apparent today. 309  Debt Problems and the World Macroeconomy 
Is there a chance that debt problems will be solved in some other 
fashion by the world macroeconomy? Here one would look to a pattern 
of  terms of  trade, interest rates, and inflation of  the  1970-73  variety. 
Since the U.S. is already at full employment, continuing depreciation 
and monetary accommodation, without  fiscal contraction, would  in- 
evitably raise inflation while sustaining growth. This policy would ease 
debt problems significantly. The only question is whether the process 
of  sliding gently into the soft landing option, with a few years delay, 
can in fact be achieved. The monetary authorities would have to be 
sufficiently accommodating and impervious to inflation, and asset hold- 
ers would have to be patient, sitting out dollar depreciation without a 
stampede. This does not seem to be a high-probability scenario. 
16.5.2  The Commodity Price Problem 
The final point to raise concerns the long-term behavior of commodity 
prices. Table 16.5 shows a long-term time series for the real price of 
commodities. Although exact comparisons across periods are impaired 
by the fact that these data are spliced from different series, the basic 
point is very striking.6 Commodity prices in the mid-1980s have reached 
the lowest level in real terms since the Great Depression. 
Several factors explain this low level of  commodity prices. One is 
the high level of real interest rates and, until 1985-86,  the other was 
the high level of the dollar. But these factors are not sufficient to explain 
the large decline as discussed in Dornbusch (1985). Others to be con- 
sidered are substitution toward  resource-saving technologies  on the 
demand side, real depreciation, and hence increased levels of output 
at  given  world  real prices.  Capacity expansions in  many producing 
countries are further factors that reduce real prices. Finally, for agri- 
cultural commodities, government support policies in industrial coun- 
tries have played an important role. 
But this large decline in  real commodity prices that has been a de- 
cisive factor in the debt performance of several countries-as,  for ex- 
ample, Argentina, Bolivia or Peru-has  bottomed  out. Indeed, over 
the twelve  months  through  May  1988, commodity  prices  in dollars 
increased by  nearly 40 percent! And, just as in  1973-74  or in several 
Table 16.5  The Real Price of Commodities: 1950-87  (Index 1980 = 100, 
period averages) 
1950-54  124  1970-74  1 IS  1985  85 
1955 -  59  113  1975- 79  104  1986  69 
1960-64  106  1980-84  94  I987  64 
1965  -69  108 
Source: IMF (1987). 310  Rudiger Dornbusch 
later episodes apparent in figure  16.2, further recovery of real  com- 
modity  prices  may turn out to be  surprisingly large  and  rapid.  The 
various  structural factors at work suggest that the level of real com- 
modity prices is unlikely to return to the high of the early  1970s. But 
a resumption of inflation and much lower real interest rates will drive 
up inventory demand and thus bring about a significant rise. 
16.6  Conclusion 
World macroeconomic policies and commodity shocks and variables 
were not, until  1981-82,  the major reason for the present debt crisis. 
Only in 1981 -82 did the sharp increase in interest rates and the decline 
in growth help to create a crisis in the aftermath of very poor policy 
performance in debtor countries. 
Since 1982 the world  macroeconomic environment has shown an 
improvement. Interest rates declined  in  nominal  and real  terms and 
growth has been sustained, as was expected in 1982. The only surprises 
have been that the dollar overvaluation lasted as long as it did, that 
there was a smaller than expected decline in  real interest rates, and 
that a massive decline in the real prices of commodities occurred. The 
world macroeconomic environment certainly did not provide a setting 
in which debtor  countries could grow out of their debts by export booms 
and improving terms of trade. 
In 1987, five years into the adjustment process, indicators of credit- 
worthiness show a deterioration except for the ratio of debt service to 
exports. And even that indicator is barely below the 1982 level. Can 
we expect that the world economy in the years ahead will provide a 
distinctly more favorable setting? The IMF  outlook  for the period 1988- 
91  shows a no-news setting: steady, moderate growth, no changes in 
the terms of trade, and an increase in real interest rates. In such an 
environment debtor countries would have to continue making massive 
real resource transfers to the creditors. Any improvement in their cre- 
ditworthiness would  have  to come primarily  from  further domestic 
adjustments. 
The no-news scenario conceals the wide variation of outcomes that 
lie ahead which depend on the nature of U.S.  fiscal and external balance 
adjustment. Two extreme possibilities are a soft landing with significant 
real interest rate reductions, improving terms of trade, and sustained 
growth, on the one hand, and a hard  landing on the other. The soft 
landing would ease debt service problems in the same way as happened 
in  1970-73.  But  the hard  landing,  with  high  real  interest rates and 
recession, possibly reinforced by protection, would certainly preclude 
debt service on the scale that has taken place  so far.  U.S. external 
adjustment forces the question of how a reduction in debtor countries’ 311  Debt Problems and the World  Macroeconomy 
noninterest balances is consistent with the lack of financing of debtors’ 
interest payments. Without the financing there cannot be any reduction 
in surpluses except by moratoria  or  default. Thus U.S.  trade adjustment 
poses a major unresolved issue for the international debt problem. 
Notes 
I. Problem debtors are defined as those that have arrears in 1983-84  or have 
rescheduled their debts since 1985. 
2. There is  some question as to which deflator to use in  calculating real 
interest rates for debtors. In figure 6.1 I use export prices of developing coun- 
tries that represent a broad index of  prices in world trade. 
3. See Dornbusch (1985). 
4. See IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1982, and Dornbusch (1985). 
5. See IMF World Economic Outlook, April  1988, table 53. 
6. See IMF (1987, 90-91)  for a discussion of the data. 
References 
Dornbusch, R. 1985. Policy and performance links between LDC debtors and 
industrial countries. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 303-56. 
,1986. International debt and economic instability. In Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas, Debt, jinancial stability and public policy. 
Feldstein,  M.  1986. International  debt service and economic growth: Some 
simple analytics.  NBER Working  Paper no.  2076. Cambridge, Mass.:  Na- 
tional Bureau of Economic Research. 
Goldbrough, D., and I. Zaidi. 1986. Transmission of economic influences from 
industrial to developing countries. In International  Monetary Fund, Stuff 
Studies for the  World Economic Outlook (July). Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook, various issues. 
.1987. Primary commodities: Market developments und outlook (May). 
Washington D.C.: IMF. 
Sachs, J. 1987. International policy coordination: The case of the developing 
country debt crisis.  NBER Working Paper  no.  2287.  Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
Sachs, J., and W.  McKibbin. 1985. Macroeconomic policies in the OECD and 
LDC economic adjustment.  Brookings  Discussion  Paper in  International 
Economics (February). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Saunders, P.  and A. Dean. 1986. The international debt situation and linkages 
between developing countries and the OECD. OECD  Economic Studies (Au- 
tumn). Paris. This Page Intentionally Left Blank